Texas A&M University School of Law

Texas A&M Law Scholarship
Student Scholarship
5-2019

Congress Prescribes Preemption of State Tort-Reform Laws to
Remedy Healthcare "Crisis": An Improper Prognosis?
Jason C. Sheffield

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/student-scholarship
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Torts Commons

CONGRESS PRESCRIBES PREEMPTION OF STATE
TORT-REFORM LAWS TO REMEDY HEALTHCARE
“CRISIS”: AN IMPROPER PROGNOSIS?
JASON C. SHEFFIELD1
Abstract
Say what you want about the tort-reform debate, but it has staying power.
Over the last half-century, legislators and commentators have extensively debated
every aspect of tort reform and the litigation “crisis” arguably giving rise to it,
without resolving much of anything. Despite this ideological stalemate, tort-reform
proponents have managed to push measures through every state legislature. With fifty
tries come fifty results, and for the most part, fifty failures. But have all these efforts
been in vain? As of yet, no. Although the healthcare system does not appear to be
improving, the numerous tort-reform measures states have adopted provide valuable
insight into the litigation crisis, even (perhaps especially) when those measures have
no effect. But Congress is impatient, one of its many child-like qualities.
In June 2017, the United States House of Representatives passed H.R. 1215—The
Protecting Access to Care Act of 2017 (PACA). If enacted, PACA would impose
comprehensive tort reform on states and, in many cases, preempt similar state laws
currently in effect. For many legislators, regardless of political affiliation, this
understandably raises federalism concerns. To appease these concerns, PACA’s
drafters included provisions that appear deferential to similar state laws. However,
when considered in context with the rest of the bill, PACA would likely preempt many
state tort-reform provisions. This Article focuses on two PACA sections—the affidavitof-merit section and the expert-witness-qualifications section. PACA adopts both
sections from existing state statutes that have proven controversial and resulted in
arguably absurd results. By analyzing state approaches in both areas, this Article
concludes that these sections of PACA would preempt all similar state laws, setting a
uniform federal standard. This uniformity, however, would come at a high price—an
unprecedented encroachment on states’ rights in an area of traditional state
regulation. Further, the inequitable and absurd results occurring in these states would
occur nationwide if PACA is enacted.
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INTRODUCTION

“Extreme remedies are very appropriate for extreme diseases”
—Hippocrates
The healthcare system is diseased. The symptoms are well known: increasing
healthcare costs, dwindling numbers of doctors and specialists, less access to care, and
a poorer quality of care. But as anyone who has ever used WebMD knows, a single
set of symptoms can indicate anything from a common cold to the bubonic plague. It
is important, then, to determine the healthcare system’s disease before prescribing a
treatment plan. With the Protecting Access to Care Act of 2017 (PACA), Congress
has proposed an extreme remedy to combat the healthcare system’s symptoms, but it
has misdiagnosed the disease.
The U.S. House of Representatives passed PACA in June 2017 with the express
purpose of “improv[ing] patient access to health care services and provid[ing]
improved medical care by reducing the excessive burden the liability system places
on the health system.” 2 Congress has identified the symptoms—decreased patient
access to care due to exorbitant healthcare costs. But what is the remedy? According
to the House, it is comprehensive federal tort reform. Implicit in this prescription,
Congress diagnosed the disease—medical malpractice plaintiffs.
PACA includes several state tort-reform measures popular with tort-reform
proponents, including a noneconomic damages cap and a shortened statute of
limitations.3 This Article, however, focuses on two interrelated sections incorporated
into PACA via an amendment introduced on the day it was passed in the House—the
affidavit of merit section and the expert witness qualifications section.
An affidavit of merit 4 is a tort-reform measure requiring medical-malpractice
plaintiffs to file an affidavit (either before, contemporaneously with, or shortly after
filing a complaint) signed by an expert or the plaintiff’s attorney attesting to the
expert’s belief that the case is meritorious. 5 Currently, twenty-seven states require a
certificate of merit in medical-malpractice cases, but each state takes a different
approach.6 Some states also increase the requirements an expert must possess before

2

Protecting Access to Care Act, H.R. 1215, 115th Cong. (2017).

3

See Emily S. Madden, One Nation, Even in Tort Law: How States Can Preempt or
Circumvent Federal Preemption of Noneconomic Damage Limitations, 18 WYO. L. REV. 53,
64 (2018) (discussing PACA’s preemption provision in its noneconomic damage cap section).
This Article uses the term “certificate of merit” when generally referring to the body of law
that has developed in this area. However, states use different terms, including “affidavit or
merit,” expert report, as well as other variations.
4

Mitchell J. Nathanson, It’s the Economy (And Combined Ratio), Stupid: Examining the
Medical Malpractice Litigation Crisis Myth and the Factors Critical to Reform, 108 PENN ST.
L. REV. 1077, 1111 (2014); Carrie Lynn Vine, Addressing the Medical Malpractice Insurance
Crisis: Alternatives to Damage Caps, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 413, 425–26 (2006).
5

6

163 CONG. REC. H5280 (June 28, 2017) (statement of Rep. Hudson). In addition to the
twenty-seven statutes in effect, at least four other states have enacted certificate of merit
statutes that are no longer effective. See Discussion infra at Section II.C. regarding state
statutes held unconstitutional in state courts.

30

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 32:1]

qualifying to sign the affidavit, often requiring that the expert practice or specialize in
the same medical field as the defendant. 7
PACA includes an express preemption clause in both the affidavit of merit and
expert witness sections. Although these provisions are titled “State Flexibility,”
neither preemption clause is flexible in its application to state law. By using vague
language, these sections initially seem to defer to state law and appear to merely
establish a legislative floor. However, when compared to similar state statutes, it
becomes clear that the drafters intended to establish both a floor and a ceiling,
preempting every state law currently in effect.
This Article argues that because no state certificate of merit approach has proven
superior to others, mandating a uniform federal standard is unsound policy. If and until
a certain approach proves effective, Congress should not foreclose states from
experimenting with different tort-reform measures. Further, PACA’s preemption
provisions will confuse state courts interpreting PACA’s preemption scope, creating
disparate holdings across jurisdictions. Finally, PACA’s expert witness qualifications
section will cause absurd results that could otherwise be avoided.
Section II details the development of tort-reform in the states, provides a survey of
state certificate of merit and expert witness statutes, and discusses some recurring
issues associated with these state statutes. Section III examines PACA’s affidavit of
merit and expert witness qualifications sections. Section III also breaks down both
PACA sections into several core elements used in the preemption analysis in Section
IV. Section IV concludes that despite preemption language disguised to appear
deferential to state law, PACA would preempt every state certificate of merit and
expert witness qualifications statute currently in effect. Section IV also discusses the
negative ramifications of this result. Section V is a brief conclusion.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. The Litigation “Crisis” and Tort Reform
Terms like “litigation crisis,” “insurance crisis, and “medical malpractice crisis,”
refer to the modern public perception that frivolous litigation is rampant in the United
States and substantially burdens our society. 8 Over the last four decades, several of
these so-called crises have garnered heavy attention from the media and politicians,
both at the state and national levels. Tort reform measures are legislative responses to
these purported crises. This section briefly examines the origins of the tort-reform
movement, its goals (both express and actual), and some empirical studies that call the
movement’s efficacy into question.
The first litigation crisis occurred in the mid-1970s, followed by subsequent crises
in the 1980s and early 2000s.9 In response, state legislatures enacted tort-reform
measures aimed at limiting personal injury claims and recovery of damages by
7

Vine, supra note 5, at 426.

8

Michael D. Johnston, The Litigation Explosion, Proposed Reforms, and Their Consequences,
21 BYU J. PUB. L. 179, 181 (2007). This Article uses the term “litigation crisis” to refer
generally to the various crises as each is rooted in the basic premise that excessive litigation
gave rise to it.
9

Scott DeVito & Andrew Jurs, An Overreaction to a Nonexistent Problem: Empirical
Analysis of Tort Reform from the 1980s to 2000s, 3 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 62, 69–70
(2015); Vine, supra note 5, at 420.
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plaintiffs.10 By the mid-1980s, more than forty states had enacted tort-reform
measures. 11 And states with tort reform already in place were not hesitant to enact
more. In 1986 alone, forty-one states enacted tort reform legislation. 12 In 1988, the
Republican party made tort reform part of its national platform, and it has remained
there ever since. 13 Today, every state has enacted or elected tort-reform measures.14
Thus, tort-reform proponents have been extremely successful in getting tort reform
enacted at the state level. But that does not mean tort reform itself has been successful.
Proponents claim that tort reform is necessary to lower skyrocketing medical
insurance premiums on doctors caused by an increased rate of personal injury
lawsuits.15 High insurance premiums, they argue, cause a decrease in physician supply
and a lower quality of care for patients. 16 Tort reform is thus a means to an end, the
end being lower medical insurance premiums and better healthcare. 17 To accomplish
this end, tort-reform measures aim to reduce the overall volume of litigation and the
amount of damages awarded in the suits that are filed. 18 In this respect, studies seem
to indicate that tort reform has been wildly successful at accomplishing the means
towards its end.
Tort filings have decreased significantly in the last several decades, as have jury
awards in cases in which the plaintiff prevails on the merits. For example, a study by
Scott DeVito and Andrew Jurs found that states enacting noneconomic damage caps
resulted in total tort filings decreasing by 18% and medical malpractice filings
decreasing by 86%. 19 Other studies show drops in damage awards of 30% or more. 20
Findings like these could lead one to conclude that tort reform proponents are right
about both the problem and the solution. However, other data calls both of those
conclusions into serious question.
In addition to examining the results occurring when states enact a noneconomic
damages cap, Devito and Jurs also looked at what happened in states that had no such
cap during the same period. They found that in these states, total tort filing decreased
by 26% in the 1990s and another 27% in the 2000s.21 Similarly, medical malpractice

10

Devito, supra note 9, at 69.

11

Vairo, infra note 34, at 1744; George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern
Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1523 (1987).
12

Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the New
in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1901 (2008).
13

Devito, supra note 9, at 69–70.

14

Nathanson, supra note 5, at 1077.

15

Devito, supra note 9, at 64.

16

Id.

17

Id. at 111.

18

Id. at 69.

19

Id. at 79.

20

Id. at 72–73.

21

Devito, supra note 9, at 79.

32

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 32:1]

filings dropped 18% during the 1990s and 24% in the 2000s. 22 Other studies show
similar patterns between states that had adopted tort reform and those that had not.23
These studies indicate that individuals with meritorious tort claims are less likely to
sue than in previous decades, regardless of whether their state has enacted tort reform.
An even more surprising finding by DeVito and Jurs is what happened when a
states noneconomic damages cap was nullified by the state’s high court. They
theorized that eliminating the caps would lead to tort filings rebounding to pre-cap
levels.24 However, they found that the opposite occurred—tort filings further
decreased in these states after the caps were eliminated. 25 While this is initially
surprising, it becomes less so when considered in context with the way in which
proponents were able to enact such pervasive tort-reform measures in the first place.
B. The Tort-Reform Movement: A Scorched Earth Campaign
From a political perspective, tort reform is a partisan issue. Republicans and
conservatives are for it, and democrats are against it. But tort reform was around long
before the Republican party added it to its platform in 1988. As it turns out, looking
at the origins of the tort-reform movement illuminates its underlying validity or lack
thereof.
The tort-reform movement may have actually started as early as the 1950s, but it
began accelerating in the 1960s and 1970s.26 Among the most influential actors were
organization such as the Chamber of Commerce, various organizations funded by
large corporations and insurance companies, as well as conservative political
organizations, and conservative individuals like the Koch brothers. 27 Armed with a
multi-billion dollar budget, they waged a tort reform war on multiple fronts.28 On one
front, there was a push to fund the campaigns of “tort-reform-oriented judges—
especially at the state supreme court level—as well as reformist legislators.”29 On
another front, they started a public relations campaign with a narrative focused on
turning the public against plaintiffs and plaintiff’s attorneys. 30 The tort reform
movement, therefore, was not just about influencing formal legal changes, it “has
always been about altering the cultural environment surrounding civil litigation.” 31
Just as important as their strategy was their message. Tort reform draws on shared
cultural ideals to create basic themes aimed at persuading the public of certain

22

Id. at 79.

23

Id. at 74–75.

24

Id. at 80.

25

Id. at 80.

26

Vairo, infra note 34, at 1741–42.

27

Id. at 1743.

28

Id. at 1742–43.

29

Id. at 1743.

30

Id. at 1741.

Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Impact it has had is Between People’s Ears: Tort
Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 453 (2000).
31
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propositions. 32 These themes are ideas that everyone agrees with when stated
abstractly. 33 Tort reform used these themes to convince the public of certain notions,
such as an out of control civil litigation system. 34 First, an abundance of frivolous
plaintiffs who, with the assistance of greedy plaintiff’s lawyers, file a substantial
number of unmeritorious lawsuits, commanding unreasonably high settlement
payments, creating the most litigious legal enjoinment in the world. 35 Second, when
meritorious claims go to trial, juries are overly sympathetic to plaintiffs and award
exorbitantly high noneconomic damages. To keep up with these expenses, insurance
companies are forced to raise premiums on doctors, which the doctors pass onto to
their patients through higher rates for their services.
Through countless television, radio, and print advertising campaigns, tort
reformers were able to shift public opinion toward a view that condemns civil
litigation and its participants. Public opinion polls conducted in the mid-1980s and
later show the effectiveness of their message.36 There was also a noticeable effect on
juror’s attitudes toward plaintiffs. Thus, it is not surprising that tort filings, particularly
medical malpractice filings, have experienced significant declines, even in the absence
of tort reform measures. There has not, however, been a corresponding decrease in
medical insurance premiums or healthcare costs generally. 37 It appears, then, that tort
reform’s main contentions have been disproven, and one might expect to see
legislatures start rolling back tort reform measures or at least not enacting more tort
reform. But tort reform proponents have found a new theme to support their agenda,
one that tort reform itself created—defensive medicine.
C. The Effect on Doctors: Defensive Medicine as a Justification for More Tort
Reform
Much like the general public, physicians and healthcare providers believe that the
litigation crisis is real and that it increases their insurance premiums.38 The fear of
malpractice lawsuits causes many doctors to practice what is known as “defensive
medicine.”39 Defensive medicine occurs when doctors practice in a way aimed at
avoiding malpractice suits rather than in a way calculated to serve the patient’s best
interest.40 Examples of defensive medicine include ordering additional diagnostic tests
after diagnosis, unnecessarily referring patients to other doctors, refusing to treat highrisk patients or to perform high-risk procedures, prescribing additional medication the
32

Id. at 454–55.

33

Id. at 455.

34

Id.

Georgene Vairo, The Role of Influence in the Arc of Tort “Reform”, 65 EMORY L. J. 1741,
1741 (2016); Marc S. Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 4–5
(1986).
35

36

Daniels, supra note 31, at 464–65.

37

Nathanson, supra note 5, at 1078.

38

Alan G. Williams, The Cure for What Ails: A Realistic Remedy for the Medical Malpractice
“Crisis”, 23 STAN L. & POL’Y REV. 477, 480-81 (2012).
39

Id. at 486.

40

Id.
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patient does not need, and recommending unnecessary invasive procedures. 41 Some
studies indicate that 83% to 93% of doctors practice some type of defensive
medicine.42 However, as just discussed, Americans are substantially less likely to sue
for injuries today, especially in the medical-malpractice context, than they were
twenty to thirty years ago. So defensive medicine is likely a by-product of tort reform’s
effect on doctors’ perception of their patients as being eager to sue in the event of an
injury, which we now know is untrue.
With the empirical evidence showing that tort reform proponent’s claims of
American litigiousness and sympathetic juries are not real, defensive medicine
provides tort reform proponents with a new justification for enacting more tort reform
measures. During House debates on PACA, some representatives cited figures as high
as $650 billion that PACA might save in defensive medicine costs. 43 This strategy is
not novel. In 2005, the Bush administration and congressional republicans cited
defensive medicine as a primary justification for a similar federal tort reform bill,
which, like PACA, was passed in the House before stalling in the Senate. 44
Somewhat ironically, defensive medicine may be more costly than medical
malpractice. Medical malpractice costs an estimated $30 billion per year, or 1% of
total healthcare spending. 45 Conversely, defensive medicine costs estimates range
from $100 billion to $300 billion, or 10% to 30% of annual healthcare spending. 46 So,
if there is a healthcare crisis occurring today, the effect tort reform’s public relations
campaign had on doctors is far more likely to be the cause than medical malpractice
suits. Proponents are thus now using a crisis of their own making to justify enacting
more tort reform. But, since tort reform leads to defensive medicine, more tort reform
will not suddenly make doctors fearless about being sued for malpractice, which is
probably not a desirable outcome anyway. With all of this in mind, the true
motivations behind tort reform have become muddied. While the motivations are
outside the scope of this Article, it may prove useful when considering the drafter’s
intent in the preemption section below.
D. State Certificate of Merit Statutes
Academics and legislators have coined numerous terms for statutes imposing
increased pleading requirements on medical-malpractice plaintiffs: affidavits and
certificates of merit, expert opinion pleading,47 special pleading,48 heightened
41

Id.

42

Id.

43

163 CONG. REC. H5273 (June 28, 2017) (statement of Rep. King).

Alexee Deep Conroy, Lessons Learned From the “Laboratories of Democracy”: A Critique
of Federal Medical Liability Reform, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1162–63 (2006).
44

45

Jill Fairchild, The Defensive Medicine Debate: Driven by Special Interests, 19 ANNALS
HEALTH L. ADVANCE D IRECTIVE 297, 301 (2010).
46

Id.

47

Parness, infra note 50, at 537 (referring to similar statutes as “Expert Opinion Pleading).

48

Mary Margaret Penrose & Dace A. Caldwell, A Short and Plain Solution to the Medical
Malpractice Crisis: Why Charles E. Clark Remains Prophetically Correct About Special
Pleading and the Big Case, 39 GA. L. REV. 971, 971 (2005).
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pleading,49 the list goes on. 50 Whatever term is used, these statutes have one thing in
common—no two are the same. Certificates of merit started gaining popularity in the
late 1990s and early 2000s as another means of achieving this goal. 51
Certificates of merit attempt to reduce frivolous lawsuits by requiring plaintiffs to
file an affidavit, usually when the suit is commenced or at some time shortly thereafter,
certifying that a medical expert has reviewed the case and has a good-faith belief that
the case has merit. 52 These statutes provide malpractice defendants with a shield
against the monetary and reputational costs associated with frivolous lawsuits.53
Twenty-seven states have a certificate of merit statute currently in effect, but the
specific provisions vary greatly between states.54
Certificates of merit exploded on the tort-reform scene in the late 1980s after
Maryland enacted its version to somewhat astonishing results. Maryland enacted a
certificate of merit statute in 1986.55 In 1987, medical-malpractice filings in Maryland
dropped 36% from the prior year. 56 The sudden and drastic results in Maryland
prompted other state legislatures to adopt similar provisions. 57 However, by the mid1990s, the immediate results Maryland experienced had waned and medicalmalpractice filings were back to pre-1987 levels.58
Certificates of merit have the same general purpose other tort-reform measures
have but are somewhat unique in how they accomplish that purpose. Instead of
reducing the monetary costs after the litigation ends, certificates of merit seek to
dispose of cases early in the litigation before doctors and insurers accumulate
substantial defense costs. Typical statutes try to accomplish this in two primary ways.
First, certificates of merit limit the volume of medical malpractice filings by
49

Dace A. Caldwell, Civil Procedure: Medical Malpractice Gets Eerie: The Eerie
Implications of a Heightened Pleading Burden in Oklahoma, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 977, 977
(2004).
This Article uses “certificate of merit” when referencing the entire body of law as some
states do not require sworn affidavits. However, this Article also uses the term “affidavit of
merit” for statutes that require the expert’s statements be in an affidavit.
50

51

Id. at 1111. Although this Article focuses on certificate of merit statutes in the medicalmalpractice arena, many states, and the United States Congress, have either enacted or
proposed similar legislation for products liability claims, professional malpractice actions
against professionals other than doctors, and sexual abuse claims. Jefferey A. Parness & Amy
Leonetti, Expert Opinion Pleading: Any Merit to Special Certificates of Merit?, 1997 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 537, 539.
52

Nathanson, supra note 5, at 1111.

53

Id.; Vine, supra note 5, at 426.

54

163 CONG. REC. H5280 (June 28, 2017) (statement of Rep. Hudson). In addition to the
twenty-seven statutes in effect, at least four other states have enacted certificate of merit
statutes that are no longer effective. See Discussion infra at Section II.C. regarding state
statutes held unconstitutional in state courts.
55

Nathanson, supra note 5, at 1111.

56

Id.

57

Id.

58

Id. at 1122 (text accompanying footnote 282).
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discouraging plaintiffs who cannot show that their claim is meritorious from bringing
a suit in the first place. 59 Second, requiring certificates of merit provide doctors a quick
and inexpensive way to dispose cases filed by plaintiffs who are unable to adequately
show their case is meritorious.60 These statutes, then, act to shield doctors and
insurance companies against the costs associated with defending meritless malpractice
claims.61
This second goal is likely the more important one. Many medical malpractice suits
end favorably for the defendant, whether due to lack of merit or otherwise. 62 However,
while the case remains open, the defendant-doctors and their insurers incur substantial
legal fees. One study showed that “nearly half of one major medical malpractice
insurer’s legal costs went to defense of cases that were ultimately resolved without
payment to the plaintiff.”63 This indicates that ultimately unsuccessful malpractice
suits, which do not result in the plaintiff recovering, contribute almost as much cost to
the healthcare system as those that plaintiffs win. Thus, proponents argue that
requiring plaintiffs to show merit at an early stage should reduce the costs of defending
these lengthy cases that will not result in compensation. 64 Further, the plaintiff, who
will not receive compensation whether the case is dismissed sooner or later, is
ultimately no worse off.
Certificate of merit statutes have proven popular among state legislatures since the
early 1990s, with no indications that their popularity will decline. Iowa enacted a
certificate of merit statute in its 2017 legislative session, becoming the most recent
state to do so. 65 But these statutes have encountered issues, especially in state courts.
State high courts in Arkansas, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Washington have all
held their state’s certificate of merit statute unconstitutional. 66 State legislatures, on
the other hand, remain fond of certificates of merit. A state legislature will commonly
respond to its supreme court’s decision by re-enacting the statute with curtailed
provisions satisfying the court’s prior objections. Oklahoma provides an illustrative
example of this practice.

59

Id.

60

Id.

61

Vine, supra note 5, at 426.

Id. (“Approximately 62 percent of all medical malpractice cases filed are resolved in favor
of the defense, with the case being either dismissed or dropped without payment to the
plaintiff.”); Williams, supra note 38, at 482 (stating that, from the late 1980s to early 1990s,
70% of medical malpractice cases resolved without payment).
62

63

Vine, supra note 5, at 426.

64

Id.

65 IOWA CODE
66

ANN. § 147.140 (West 2017).

See Crystal Axelrod, Certificate of Merit Requirement Violates Right of Access to Courts,
35 AM. J.L. & MED. 692 (2009) (citing Putnam v. Wenatchee Valley Med. Ctr., PS, 216 P.3d
374 (Wash. 2009); Wimley v. Reid, 2007-CA-00593-SCT (Miss. 2008); Summerville v.
Thrower, 235 S.W.3d 415 (Ark. 2007); Hiatt v. S. Health Facilities, 626 N.E.2d 71 (Ohio
1994)); Jablow, infra note 68, at 16.
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Oklahoma enacted its first certificate of merit statute in 2003. 67 In 2006, the
statute’s validity was challenged. 68 In an 8 to 1 decision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
held that requiring affidavits of merit in medical malpractice cases violated the
Oklahoma constitution’s “special law” provision and the right of access to the state’s
court system. 69 Undeterred, the Oklahoma legislature amended the certificate of merit
statute in 2009.70 In 2013, the updated statute was again before the Oklahoma Supreme
Court, and it was again held unconstitutional—under the exact same provisions as
before.71 Later that same year, the legislature enacted yet another iteration of the same
statute.72 In November 2017, relying on the same constitutional provisions it did in
2006 and 2013, the Oklahoma Supreme Court once again struck down the statute. 73
E. Survey of State Certificate of Merit Statutes
Although generally enacted for similar purposes, state certificate of merit
provisions vary greatly between states.74 But state certificate of merit provisions can
be divided into two broad categories: (1) the substantive requirements and (2) the
timing requirements.75
1.

Substantive Elements of Certificates of Merit

To a greater degree than the timing requirements, states have developed unique
approaches to the substantive provisions in their certificates of merit. However, a
thorough review of state statutes has gleaned several typical “elements” that most state
statutes contain a variation of. These are not an exclusive listing of all possible
elements but instead a representation of the most common provisions found in many

67

63 OKL.ST.ANN. § 1-1708.1E (Supp. 2003) (repealed by 2009 Okla. Sess. Laws, § 87, c.
228).
68

Zeier v. Zimmer, Inc., 2006 WL 3717904 (Okla. Dec. 19, 2006).

69

Valerie Jablow, Oklahoma Justices Reject Affidavit of Merit Requirement in Med-Mal
Cases, 43 MAR TRIAL 16, 18 (2007) (the Oklahoma Special Law provision prohibits special
laws regulating “the practice or jurisdiction of, or changing the rules of evidence in, judicial
proceedings or inquiry before the courts.”).
70

Wall v. Marouk, 2013 OK 36, ¶ 9, 302 P.3d 775, 781; John v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 2017
OK 81, ¶ 12, 405 P.3d 681, 686.
71

See Wall v. Marouk, 302 P.3d at 777.

72

John v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 2017 OK 81 ¶ 15.

73

Id. at ¶ 1.

74

In addition to the elements discussed in this section, state statutes come in many different
forms. For instance, state statutes vary in scope—that is, what claims the statute applies to. In
New Jersey, the certificate of merit statute applies to “any action for damages for personal
injury, wrongful death or property damage resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or
negligence by a licensed person in his profession or occupation. . . .” N.J STAT. ANN §
2A:53A-27 (West 2017). Conversely, the Texas affidavit-of-merit statute only applies if a
plaintiff asserts “a health care liability claim.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(a)
(West 2017). States also differ regarding where the statute is codified. See Parness, supra note
51, at 418-19. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a) (West 2017).
75

See Parness, supra note 51, at 419.
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state statutes. Further, two states often take the same approach to one element and a
very different approach to some, or even all, of the other elements.
a.

Role of the Expert Witness

States have taken two primary approaches regarding the expert witness’s role in
the certificate of merit process, with a few states taking hybrid approaches that
incorporate aspects of both. On one hand, some states require that the plaintiff’s
attorney certify that she consulted a medical expert before filing the suit and that the
expert expressed a belief that the plaintiff’s case is meritorious.76 For example, New
York’s certificate of merit statute requires that the plaintiff’s attorney provide a
certificate declaring that she “has consulted with at least one physician . . . who the
attorney reasonably believes is knowledgeable in the relevant issues involved in the
particular action, and that the attorney has concluded . . . that there is a reasonable
basis for the commencement of such action.” 77 In addition to New York, states
following this approach include: Colorado, Hawaii, Minnesota, Mississippi, North
Carolina, and Vermont. 78
On the other hand, most states require that a medical professional personally make
statements in the affidavit or certificate, rather than the plaintiff’s attorney merely
certifying that a consultation occurred. 79 For instance, in New Jersey, “the plaintiff
shall . . . provide each defendant with an affidavit of an appropriate licensed person
that there exists a reasonable probability that the care . . . exercised or exhibited in the
treatment . . . that is the subject of the complaint, fell outside acceptable professional
or occupational standards or treatment practices.” 80 Along with New Jersey, fifteen
other states also follow this approach: Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Iowa,
Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 81
Some states take a hybrid approach in that, although the plaintiff’s attorney must
attest that a consultation occurred, the expert must also make a written report
expressing their belief that the case is meritorious, which the attorney must attach to
the affidavit. For example, Florida’s statute provides that

76

See Benjamin Grossberg, Uniformity, Federalism, and Tort Reform: The Erie Implications
of Medical Malpractice Certificate of Merit Statutes, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 222 (2010).
77

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3012-a(a)(1) (McKinney 2018).

78

COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-602 (2017); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 671-12.5 (West 2017);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.682 (West 2017); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-58 (West 2017); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j)(1)-(2) (2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1042 (West 2017).
79

Grossberg, supra note 76, at 222.

80

N.J STAT. ANN § 2A:53A-27 (West 2018).

81

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2603 (2017); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-209 (2017); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6853 (West 2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (West 2017); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 147.140 (West 2017); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04 (West 2017);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2912d (West 2017); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41A.071 (West 2017);
N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 28-01-46 (West 2017); OHIO CIV. R. 10(D)(2) (West 2018); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-36-100 (2018); TEX. C IV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351 (West 2017);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.150 (West 2018); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-6 (West 2017);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-2-1519 (West 2017).
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No action shall be filed for . . . medical negligence, . . . unless the attorney filing
the action has made a reasonable investigation as permitted by the circumstances to
determine that there are grounds for a good faith belief that there has been negligence
in the care or treatment of the claimant. The complaint . . . shall contain a certificate
of counsel that such reasonable investigation gave rise to a good faith belief . . . for an
action against each named defendant. For purposes of this section, good faith may be
shown to exist if . . . counsel has received a written opinion . . . of an expert . . . that
there appears to be evidence of medical negligence. 82
Notably, this section further directs that if the court determines the attorney did not
file the certificate in good faith, the court “shall” award attorney’s fees and report the
attorney to the Florida Bar for a disciplinary review. 83 Thus, while the statute does not
mandate a written expert report, it is the only method the statute mentions by which a
litigant can show the required good-faith belief in the action’s merits. And failure to
exhibit this good faith carries heavy penalties for the attorney. Other states following
this approach include Connecticut, Illinois, and Missouri. 84
Still other states take slightly different approaches than those already discussed.
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Tennessee require that the plaintiff’s attorney sign the
affidavit, and the affidavit must certify that the attorney consulted an expert who
provided a written report stating a belief that the case is meritorious. 85 However, these
states do not require the expert’s report be attached to the affidavit.86 Finally, Utah
requires that both the attorney and the expert sign separate affidavits. 87
b.

Required Contents of the Certificate of Merit

Once again, states differ substantially regarding what information the certificate
must contain, regardless of whether the expert or the attorney fills out the certificate.
Some states are more lenient and only require that the expert express a general belief
that a reasonable basis exists indicating the case is meritorious. 88 This approach can
apply whether the expert or the plaintiff’s attorney is the one making out the
certificate; however, states requiring only that the attorney certify she consulted an
expert are more likely to follow this approach. For example, in Illinois, the affidavit
must contain a statement by the plaintiff’s attorney that the consulted expert
determined “that there is a reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing” the lawsuit

82

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.104 (West 2017).

83

Id.

84

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-190a (West 2018); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622 (West
2018); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 538.225 (West 2017).
85

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 19.1 (West 2017) (held unconstitutional by John v. St. Francis
Hosp., Inc., 2017 OK 81); PA. R. CIV. PROC. NO. 1042.3(a) (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26122 (West 2018).
86

OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 19.1 (West 2017); PA. R. CIV. PROC. NO. 1042.3(a) (2017); §
29-26-122.
87

UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-423 (West 2017).

88

Parness, supra note 51, at 571-72.
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and that, based on the expert’s report and consultation, the plaintiff’s attorney believes
there to be “a reasonable and meritorious cause for filing” the case. 89
States taking stricter approaches do so in one (or both) of two ways. First, some
states require the plaintiff’s expert state specific actions the defendant took that
constituted malpractice. 90 In Georgia, for instance, a plaintiff’s certificate of merit
must contain an affidavit signed by an expert setting “forth specifically at least one
negligent act or omission claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim.” 91
Second, some states will require specific statements by the affiant that relate to the
elements of the plaintiff’s claim. In this respect, states take various approaches
regarding what elements to which the expert must attest. Some states require that the
expert state the appropriate standard of care and the way in which the defendant
breached that standard (i.e., duty and breach). 92 Some states, however, go farther and
require the expert make statements regarding duty, breach, and causation.93 This is the
strictest approach states take in this regard. states following these approaches include
Arizona, Delaware, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and West
Virginia.94
c.

Scrutiny of Attesting Expert’s Qualifications.

Regardless of who must make out the certificate, each state requires that the
plaintiff’s attorney have some degree of confidence that the expert relied upon is
qualified to testify. States are all over the spectrum in this regard. At the low end, some
states merely require that the plaintiff’s attorney have a “reasonable” or “good faith”
belief that the expert is qualified to give an opinion in the case. 95 At the high end of
the spectrum, some states apply the same standard as an expert who testifies at trial.96
Thus, if the plaintiff’s expert would not qualify as an expert at trial, the expert is also
incompetent to fill out the pre-trial certificate of merit. Further, as will be discussed in
greater depth later, many states impose heightened expert witness qualifications in
medical malpractice cases, making this approach a heavy burden at an early stage of
the litigation.97

89

735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622(a)1 (West 2018).

90

Parness, supra note 51, at 562.

91

GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (West 2018).

92

See, e.g., N.J STAT. ANN § 2A:53A-27 (West 2018); and, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j)
(2018).
93

Jeanne M. Scherlinck, Medical Malpractice, Tort Reform, and The Separation of Powers
Doctrine in Michigan, 44 WAYNE L. REV. 313, 337 (Winter 1998).
94

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2603 (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6853 (West 2017); MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04 (West 2017); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2912d
(West 2017); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 538.225 (West 2017); PA. R. CIV. PROC. No. 1042.3 (2017); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-6 (West 2017).
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OHIO CIV. R. 10(D)(2) (West 2018).

96

VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1042 (West 2017).
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See Discussion infra, at III.D.
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Time of Filing

As to when the plaintiff’s certificate of merit must be filed, states have taken three
general approaches. Most states require contemporaneous filing of the certificate with
the complaint.98 Some states require that plaintiffs file a certificate of merit as a
prerequisite to initiating a medical-malpractice lawsuit. 99 Still other states require
plaintiffs to file their certificate of merit after the lawsuit is initiated, but usually before
any meaningful discovery has occurred. 100 This future filing date is usually tied to
some other procedural step; for instance, within sixty days of the defendant filing its
answer.101
a.

Certificate of Merit as a Prerequisite to Filing a Claim

One state, West Virginia, requires that plaintiffs file a certificate of merit thirty
days before commencing a medical malpractice action. 102 Although pre-suit
certificates of merit are rare, many states impose a notice of suit requirement, whereby
plaintiffs must serve the defendant with a written notice stating the plaintiff’s intention
to bring a malpractice action, but without requiring the plaintiff to consult an expert. 103
b.

Certificate of Merit Filed Contemporaneously with the Pleadings

The most popular approach is the contemporaneous filing requirement. Currently,
eighteen states follow this approach: Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New York, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Washington. 104
However, while these states take the same approach regarding timing, they do not
agree on much else, and many variations exist between them. For example, in North
Carolina, a medical malpractice plaintiff’s pleading must “specifically assert[] that the
medical care and all medical records pertaining to the alleged negligence that are
available to the plaintiff after reasonable inquiry have been reviewed by. . .” either “a
person who is reasonably expected to qualify as an expert witness. . .” or “a person
98

Id. at 552.

99

Id.

100

Id.

101

Nuveen Mun. Trust v. Withumsmith Brown, P.C., 692 F.3d 283, 290 (3d Cir. 2012)
(discussing N.J STAT. ANN § 2A:53A-27).
102

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7B-6 (West 2017).

See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 364(a) (West 2018) (“No action based upon the health
care provider's professional negligence may be commenced unless the defendant has been
given at least 90 days' prior notice of the intention to commence the action.”).
103

104

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-190a (WEST 2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6853 (WEST
2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.104 (WEST 2008); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (WEST 2007);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 671-12.5 (WEST 2018); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622 (West
2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2912d; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.682; MISS. CODE ANN. § 111-58; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41A.071; N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3012-a; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1,
Rule 9(j)(1)-(2); OHIO CIV. R. 10(D)(2); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 19.1 (held
unconstitutional by John v. St. Francis Hosp., Inc., 2017 OK 81); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-36100; TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-122; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1042; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
7.70.150.
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that the complainant will seek to have qualified as an expert . . . and who is willing to
testify that the medical care did not comply with the applicable standard of care.” 105
Conversely, most states require that the certificate be in the form of an affidavit or
written report, rather than specifically alleged in the pleadings. This is likely because
North Carolina’s approach may conflict with the Twombly and Iqbal pleading standard
when medical malpractice cases wind up in federal court. 106 However, that issue is
outside this Article’s scope.
c.

Certificate of Merit Filed at After the Initial Pleadings

The third approach requires filing after the complaint is filed but usually well
before trial. Eleven states currently follow this approach: Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah,
and Wyoming.107
Within this category, there are two main elements: (1) how the beginning of the
filing period is determined and (2) the period’s length. Regarding the first element,
most statutes tie the start of the filing period to a specific procedural device, typically
the filing of the complaint or the defendant’s answer. Six states use the complaint’s
filing date to initiate the plaintiff’s certificate of merit filing period. Those states are
Arkansas, Colorado, Maryland, Missouri, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania. 108
Three states—New Jersey, Texas, and Wyoming—start the certificate of merit
filing period when the defendant files her answer. 109 Here again, although these three
state statutes share a general characteristic, each has its own nuances, which results in
significant variability between them. For example, in Texas, a plaintiff has 120 days
from the time the defendant files its original answer to serve the expert report on the
defendant.110 But in New Jersey, a plaintiff alleging malpractice or negligence against
105

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 9(j)(1)-(2).

106

Grossberg, supra note 76, at 245.

107

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2603; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-209; COLO. REV. STAT. § 1320-602; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04; Mo. Ann. Stat. § 538.225; N.J STAT.
ANN § 2A:53A-27; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 28-01-46; PA. R. CIV. PROC. No. 1042.3; TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-423; WYO. STAT. ANN. §
9-2-1519.
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-114-209(b)(3)(A) (2017) (“The plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days
after the complaint is filed with the clerk to file the affidavit. . .”); but see Summerville v.
Thrower, 253 S.W.3d 415 (Ark. 2007) (holding § 16-114-209(b)(3)(A) unconstitutional);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-602(1)(a); (“the plaintiff’s or complainant’s attorney shall file with
the court a certificate of review . . . within sixty days after the service of the complaint”); MD.
CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-2A-04(b)(1)(i) (requiring that plaintiffs “file a certificate of
a qualified expert . . . within 90 days from the date of the complaint”); MO. ANN. STAT. §
538.225 (“Such affidavit shall be filed no later than ninety days after the filing of the
petition”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 28-01-46 (“plaintiff serves upon the defendant an
affidavit containing an admissible expert opinion . . . within three months of the
commencement of the action”); PA. R. C IV. PROC. No. 1042.3(a) (“the attorney for the plaintiff
. . . shall file with the complaint or within sixty days after the filing of the complaint, a
certificate of merit”).
108

109

N.J STAT. ANN § 2A:53A-27; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351; WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 9-2-1519.
110

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(a).
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a licensed professional (not just healthcare professionals, but most professionals
licensed by the state) “shall, within 60 days following the date of filing of the answer
to the complaint by the defendant, provide each defendant with an affidavit of an
appropriate licensed person.” 111 One state, Arizona, requires that the plaintiff’s
affidavit of merit be included with the initial pretrial disclosures.112
F. State Expert Witness Qualifications Statutes
Another increasingly common tort-reform measure are statutes imposing
heightened qualifications requirements on expert witnesses. These statutes limits
experts who may testify to the applicable standard of care in a medical malpractice
case, usually by requiring that the expert and defendant share similar certifications and
experience. 113 These statutes commonly apply to trial testimony, but many states also
apply the heightened standard to the plaintiff’s certificate-of-merit expert.114
Medical malpractice litigation is often extremely complex; thus, as a practical
matter, expert testimony is usually necessary to establish the proper standard of care
and whether that standard was breached. 115 Consequently, medical experts are the
most commonly utilized category of experts.116 Many states have enacted heightened
qualification standards applying exclusively to medical-malpractice experts.117 These
statutes are based on the policy that, given the inherent complexity of medical
malpractice cases, only experts with similar training and experience to the defendant
are qualified to attest to the appropriate standard of care. 118 This section discusses a
few popular metrics states have developed to effectuate these policies.
1.

Heightened Expert Witness Qualifications Provisions
a.

Specialty Matching

Many states impose what this Article refers to as “specialty matching”—requiring
that expert witnesses share the same medical specialties as the defendant they intend
to offer testimony against. Although some states go farther than others, the typical
statute requires that, if the party against whom testimony is being offered is a specialist
in a particular medical field, the witness must also specialize in the same or a similar

111

N.J. STAT. §2A:53A-27.

112

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-2603(B).

113

Vine, supra note 5, at 426.

See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2912d (2018) (requiring that the plaintiff’s certificate
of merit expert meet the expert witness qualifications contained in MICH. COMP. LAWS §
600.2169 (2018)).
114
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Athan P. Papailiou, Making Sense of the Linchpin to Medical Malpractice Litigation:
Expert Witness Qualification, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 539, 540 (2013); Rickee N. Arntz,
Competency of Medical Expert Witnesses: Standards and Qualifications, 24 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 1359 (1991).
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Arntz, supra note 115, at 1359.
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Id. at 1360.
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Baker v. University Physicians Healthcare, 296 P.3d 42, 46 (Ariz. 2013).
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field before the witness may testify regarding the standard of care in that field. 119
Further, some states also require that the witness match any subspecialties of the
defendant.120 Some states additionally require that expert witnesses and defendants
share the same board certifications.121
The underlying policy of specialty matching is simple—in highly specialized
medical fields, only other such specialists know the actual standard of care. At first
blush, this policy sounds reasonable. However, due to courts strictly construing these
statutes to effectuate the legislature’s intent, absurd results can occur. For example,
in Baker v. United Physicians Healthcare, seventeen-year-old Tara Baker died after
the defendant, Dr. Brenda Wittman, treated her for blood clots. 122 Tara’s father (Baker)
sued Dr. Wittman, claiming that Tara’s death resulted from medical malpractice. 123
Dr. Wittman specialized in pediatrics with a subspecialty in pediatric hematologyoncology. 124 Baker retained Dr. Robert Brouillard as an expert witness. 125 Dr.
Brouillard specialized in internal medicine and had subspecialties in both hematology
and oncology. 126 The defense moved for summary judgement, claiming that Dr.
Brouillard did not qualify as an expert under Arizona’s expert witness qualifications
statute.127 Concluding that pediatric hematology was the relevant specialty, the court
held that Dr. Brouillard was not qualified to testify as an expert in the case and granted
the defendant’s motion. 128
After the appellate court affirmed, the Arizona Supreme Court granted review to
address section 12-2604’s application. 129 The court first determined that the statute
requires an expert witness to specialize in the same specialty as the defendant “only
when the care or treatment at issue was within that specialty.” 130 The court defined
“specialty” as “a limited area of medicine in which a physician is or may become
board certified.” 131 The court then determined the scope of “specialty” to include all
recognized specialties and subspecialties.132 The court reasoned that excluding
subspecialties from the definition of “specialty” (which the court of appeals did in this
119

Id.

120

Id.

121

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2604(A)(2); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2169(1).
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Baker, 296 P.3d at 45.

123

Id.

124

Id.

125

Id.

126

Id.

127

Id. In Arizona, the standard of care in a medical malpractice case must be proved through
the testimony of an expert who meets the requirements of § 12-2604. Thus, a plaintiff cannot
establish an essential element of the claim if her expert is underqualified.
128

Baker, 296 P.3d at 46.

129

Id.

130

Id. at 47.

131

Id. at 48.

132

Id. at 49.
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case) too broadly construed section 12-2604 because it would allow, for example, a
pediatrician unfamiliar with hematology to testify regarding a pediatric hematologist’s
care of “a seventeen-year-old patient suffering from a serious blood disorder.” 133
Despite emphasizing Tara’s age as it related to a general pediatrician’s
hypothetical testimony, the court dismissed its relevance in the actual case before it.
Applying its newly developed test for section 12-2604, the court determined that
because evidence showed that both a pediatric and non-pediatric hematologist could
have treated a seventeen-year-old’s blood disorder, “Dr. Wittman was practicing
within her specialty of pediatric hematology-oncology.” 134 Thus, only an expert in that
specialty could testify to the appropriate standard of care, even though other specialists
could have provided competent treatment. 135
Specialty matching can sometimes lead to a plaintiff’s expert being disqualified as
a witness because the expert is over qualified in relation to the defendant. In Decker
v. Flood, the plaintiff sought treatment for a toothache from the defendant, who was a
dentist.136 Dr. Flood determined that Decker needed a root canal and immediately
performed the procedure.137 After returning home, Decker contacted Dr. Flood after
experiencing severe pain. 138 Decker returned to Dr. Flood’s office, at which point Dr.
Flood administered so much Novocain that Decker stopped breathing and had to be
rushed to a hospital. 139 After Decker recovered, he consulted Dr. Michael Gallagher,
an endodontist, who completed the procedure Dr. Flood had botched. 140 Decker
brought a malpractice suit and, pursuant to Michigan law, attached an affidavit of
merit from Dr. Gallagher to the complaint. 141 Dr. Flood moved to dismiss, arguing that
because he was only a general practitioner, and Dr. Gallagher specialized in root
canals, Dr. Gallagher was not qualified to attest to the appropriate standard of care
under Michigan’s expert witness qualifications statute. 142 In response, the “plaintiffs
argued that the statute ‘did not make sense,’ because it precluded Dr. Gallagher, whose
practice was limited to root canals, from giving expert testimony concerning the
standard of practice for root canals.”143 The trial court granted Dr. Flood’s motion,
noting that Michigan’s statute clearly precludes experts from testifying against general
practitioners regarding the standard of care for general practitioners. 144
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137

Id.

138

Id.

139

Id.

140

Id.

141

Id.

142
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The Michigan expert qualifications statute directs that an expert cannot attest to
the appropriate standard of care if the opposing party is a general practitioner unless
the expert devoted most of her professional time during the year preceding the incident
giving rise to the claim at issue to “active clinical practice as a general practitioner.”145
On appeal, Decker argued that the trial court’s interpretation created an absurd result
whereby an expert eminently qualified to testify concerning the standard of care for
performing root canals is unqualified to testify about root canals.146 The Court of
Appeals disagreed and affirmed, stating that “[they] found no absurdity or
unreasonableness in the requirement that the qualifications of a purported expert
match the qualifications of the defendant against whom that expert intends to
testify.” 147
b.

Recency of Expert’s Experience

In addition to specialty matching, many statutes require that the expert to have
been practicing in that specialty at the time of the events giving rise to the current
litigation and been practicing in that specialty for a prescribed number of years
beforehand. The requisite number of years preceding the plaintiff’s injury that the
witness must have been practicing varies from one to six years depending on the
state.148 These statutes typically apply conjunctively with the specialty matching
requirements, further narrowing the number of qualified experts available. Some states
further require, not only that the witness have been practicing for the specified number
of years, but also that they have devoted a majority of their professional time to the
defendant’s specialty during that period. 149
c.

Expert Licensed in Same Region as Defendant—The Locality Rule

Although most states no longer restrict where an expert is licensed, a few states
require that the expert witness be licensed in the same geographic region as the
defendant. States that do impose geographical licensure limitations on expert
witnesses take one of two main approaches. First, some states require the expert be
licensed in the same state as the defendant or a contiguous state. Second, other states
require the expert practice within a certain distance to the defendant, measured in
terms of square miles from the defendant’s practice or the location the allegedly
negligent care occurred.
Tennessee follows the former approach. Tennessee’s statute, which applies to trial
testimony and certificates of merit, provides that “[n]o person in a health care
profession … shall be competent to testify . . . to establish the facts required to be
established by subsection (a), unless the person was licensed to practice in the state or
145

Id. at 166; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2169(1) (2018).
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Flood, 638 N.W.2d at 167.

147

Id. at 168.

148

See MICH. COMP. L AWS § 600.2169 (requiring expert to have been practicing in the
defendant’s specialty for one year preceding the incident at issue in the litigation) see also 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622 (“affiant has consulted and reviewed the facts of the case with
a health professional who the affiant reasonably believes: . . . (ii) practices or has practiced
within the last 6 years or teaches or has taught within the last 6 years in the same area of
health care or medicine that is at issue in the particular action)
149

See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2604(A)(2).
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a contiguous bordering state. . . “150 These geographic restrictions have received
increased criticism as technological advances create less disparity in the standard of
care between regions. 151
III.

THE PROTECTING ACCESS TO C ARE ACT OF 2017

On June 28, 2017, the U.S. House of Representatives passed PACA, a
comprehensive tort-reform bill incorporating several controversial provisions. 152 Most
Democrats, as well as a few Republicans, staunchly opposed PACA. Many public
interest groups also expressed concerns about PACA, including the Center for Justice
and Democracy, Consumer Federation of America, Consumer Union, National
Association of Consumer Advocates, National Women’s Health Network, and Public
Citizen. 153 In addition, the American Bar Association also opposed PACA, stating that
for “200 years, the authority to determine medical liability law has rested in the states”
and that this “is a hallmark of the American justice system.” 154 On the day it was
passed, several amendments were introduced and incorporated into the bill—including
an affidavit of merit requirement and heightened expert witness qualifications. 155
A. PACA’s Affidavit of Merit Section
Section 14 of PACA details the affidavit of merit requirements. Under this section,
the plaintiff must file, contemporaneously with the complaint, an affidavit signed by
an expert meeting section 13’s expert witness requirements. 156 The affidavit must
certify that the expert reviewed the plaintiff’s relevant medical records and contain a
statement of the following elements: (1) the applicable standard of care; (2) the
expert’s opinion that the defendant breached that standard; (3) and how the
defendant’s breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.157 Further, the expert
must state the actions or omissions the defendant should have observed to comply with
the standard of care and list the medical records the expert reviewed. 158
Several essential elements can be gleaned from this section that are relevant to the
subsequent preemption analysis. PACA’s affidavit of merit section has eight core
elements. Those core elements are:
1. The expert (rather than the plaintiff’s attorney) must sign the affidavit;
2. The expert must meet the heightened qualification requirements in section 13;
150
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3. A statement certifying that the expert reviewed all relevant medical records;
4. The expert must state the applicable standard of care;
5. The expert must state an opinion that the defendant breached the standard of
care;
6. The expert must state what actions the defendant should have taken or omitted
to comply with that standard;
7. The expert must state how the breach of the standard proximately caused the
plaintiff’s injury; and
8. The expert must list all medical records reviewed.
B. PACA’s Expert Witness Qualifications Section
Section 13 contains the requirements to qualify as an expert witness. Under this
section, a plaintiff’s expert must be licensed to practice medicine in any state.159 If the
defendant is or claims to be a specialist, the plaintiff’s expert must specialize in the
defendant’s specialty; and if the defendant is or claims to be board-certified, the expert
must also be board certified in the defendant’s specialty. 160 Further, the expert must
have either actively practiced the defendant’s specialty or taught that specialty at an
accredited medical school or residency program for a one-year period immediately
preceding the alleged malpractice. 161 If the defendant is a general practitioner,
however, the expert must have spent the preceding year actively practicing as a general
practitioner or teaching the same. 162
Thus, this section adopts most controversial elements that have developed in the
states. The four core elements of this section are:
1. The expert must be licensed to practice medicine.
2. Specialty and board certification matching;
3. The expert was actively practicing or teaching the defendant’s specialty for at
least one year prior to the alleged malpractice; and
4. Limits experts in a case against a general practitioner to other general
practitioners.
C. PACA’s “State Flexibility” Provisions
Both the affidavit of merit and expert witness qualifications sections contain an
express preemption provision titled “State Flexibility.” Both of these provisions direct
that nothing in the respective sections intends to preempt state laws imposing
“additional” requirements on plaintiffs. 163 This title is ironic because, as Congressman
Steven Cohen points out, the “so-called state flexibility provisions . . . attempt to brush
off federalism concerns that these provisions are mostly one-way preemptive. They
only preserve state laws that mirror the amendments’ requirements and state laws
which include requirements in addition to those imposed by the amendment.” 164
However, Representative Cohen’s statement might be overly generous as the express
159
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language does not specifically preclude identical state statutes from preemption.
Rather, as is developed below, even virtually identical state statutes will likely be
preempted. As one Congresswoman put it, PACA “would preempt state law in all 50
states with a rigid, uniform set of rules designed to make it more difficult for
malpractice victims to obtain relief in the courts.”165
D. Both Sections are Based on Existing State Statutes
Although the legislative history is silent on the matter, PACA borrows both its
affidavit of merit and expert witness qualifications sections from existing state
statutes—the affidavit of merit from Michigan 166 and the expert witness qualifications
from Arizona. 167 The sections are far too similar for it to be coincidental. As to the
affidavit of merit sections, PACA adopts 95%168 of Michigan’s statutory language,
with several of the discrepancies merely phrasing related. 169 Most notably, PACA
adopts every substantive provision in the Michigan statute except one. The only part
of Michigan’s statute that PACA omits is the provision requiring the plaintiff’s
attorney reasonably believe that the expert meets the requirements contained in the
separate qualifications statute. 170 PACA omit this language that would give the
plaintiff’s attorney an opportunity to show that she reasonably believed the expert met
those requirements, when the expert in fact did not. Further, PACA contains an
additional requirement absent from Michigan’s statute. PACA’s fifth enumerated
provision, requiring a statement of all the medical records the expert reviewed, is
wholly the amendment drafter’s creation. 171
Regarding the expert witness sections, PACA also borrows 95% 172 of Arizona’s
statutory language. 173 And in this case, the discrepancies are completely de minimis.
However, while section 13 does not omit any of Arizona’s provisions, unlike section
14, it does not add anything absent from the state statute.
When a legislature adopts a statute from another jurisdiction, it is presumed to have
also adopted the judicial interpretations of that statute by the jurisdiction’s highest
court.174 Federal courts, then, may look to decisions by the Arizona and Michigan
Supreme Courts for guidance on interpreting PACA’s adopted statutory language.
Thus, PACA’s expert witness qualifications section likely implicitly adopts the
decision in Baker, where the court held that, although the expert could have
165
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competently treated the patient, he could not testify because the defendant was acting
within her unique specialty when she caused the patient’s death.175
Although this rule is based on stare decisis principles, whereby things that have
already been determined do not need to be constantly redetermined, it is not
conclusive—it is likely “that if a precedent underlying an adopted statute were no
longer vital or were poorly reasoned,” courts will not follow it. 176 So, while those state
supreme court decisions may be helpful, it is important to remember that federal courts
will not be bound by them. 177 However, these statutes are unambiguous, so even if
potentially absurd results occur, courts are likely to enforce them regardless because
the
legislature
is
free
to
mandate
absurd
results.178
IV.

PACA WOULD PREEMPT ALL STATE CERTIFICATE OF MERIT AND
EXPERT WITNESS QUALIFICATIONS STATUTES

Due to the stringent requirements PACA places on medical-malpractice plaintiffs
and its vague preemption language, PACA would preempt most, if not all, state
certificate of merit and expert witness qualifications statutes. There are many possible
effects of this; for certificates of merit, Congress would foreclose states from
experimenting to determine the best approach for this relatively new tort-reform
measure. Further, regarding expert witness qualifications statutes, Congress would
create a rigid standard, robbing trial court judges of their typical gatekeeper role in
determining expert qualifications, which would ultimately result in otherwise
qualified experts being disqualified based on arbitrary specialty matching. Moreover,
PACA’s enactment, which would cause these perverse results, directly conflicts with
federalism principles and violates state sovereignty.
A. Federal Supremacy and Preemption of State Law
Federalism is a central component of the United States system of government; it
“adopts the principle that both the National and State Governments have elements of
sovereignty the other is bound to respect.” 179 The existence of multiple sovereigns
creates the possibility that the laws of one will conflict with the other. 180 Foreseeing
the inevitable state and federal clash, the Framers provided a solution—the Supremacy
Clause.181 The Supremacy Clause bestows upon Congress the power to preempt state
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laws.182 However, when state and federal law are at odds, courts—not Congress—
decide whether Congress intended to preempt the state law. 183 In making this
determination, Congressional purpose “is the ultimate touchstone,” 184 so courts start
with the language of the federal statute. 185
There are two general preemption categories—express preemption and implied
preemption. Express preemption is the most straightforward; it exists when Congress
explicitly states an intention to limit the application of state law.186 However, Congress
is not required to make this intention explicit; if a court finds that the state and federal
laws cannot coexist, the court may deem that the federal law preempts the state law. 187
This scenario leads to the two implied preemption categories—conflict preemption
and field preemption.
Conflict preemption arises “when state and federal regulations conflict.” 188 There
are two situations in which conflict may occur: (1) when complying with both the
federal and state law is impossible and (2) where the state law represents an obstacle
to accomplishing the federal statute’s congressional purpose. 189 Alternatively, field
preemption exists when Congress determines that regulation of a particular field of
activity is within its “exclusive governance” but failed to include any express language
manifesting that intention. 190 In such instances, courts have held that “the intent to
displace state law altogether can be inferred from a framework of regulation ‘so
pervasive . . . that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it’ or where there
is a ‘federal interest . . . so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.’” 191
PACA’s “State Flexibility” sections are express preemption clauses, so express
preemption is implicated in this discussion. However, even when Congress explicitly
states it intention to preempt some state law, situations can arise that necessitate courts
relying on implied preemption principles to discern congressional intent. 192 There is a
dispute as to whether this is appropriate, but for the purposes of this Article, it is
enough to know that this principle exists.193
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B. PACA’s Preemption Scope
The Supreme Court interprets expressly preemptive statutory language
methodically. When a statute contains preemptive language, courts need not go
beyond the statute’s text to determine that Congress intended to preempt state law, to
at least some extent; however, courts must still identify the statute’s preemption
scope. 194 The preemption scope analysis begins with the text, but the court’s
interpretation “does not occur in a contextual vacuum.” 195 Rather, when discerning a
statute’s preemption scope, the interpretation relies on two preemption
presumptions. 196
The first such presumption finds its roots in federalism. Because states enjoy
independent sovereignty in the federal system, courts presumes Congress has not
“cavalierly pre-empt[ed] state-law causes of action.” 197 Further, courts initially
assume that federal law does not preempt state police powers unless that was
Congress’ “clear and manifest purpose.” 198 So, while congressional intent remains the
focal point of preemption analysis, this presumption “puts a thumb on the interpretive
scale” for federal laws in areas traditionally occupied by the states.199
The second presumption guides the analysis of a statute’s preemption scope. 200
This presumption directs that, in all preemption cases, “the purpose of Congress is the
ultimate touchstone.” 201 This intent is primarily discerned from the statute’s language
and surrounding statutory framework. 202 However, the statute’s structure and purpose
as a whole is also relevant; this is discerned not only from the text, but also from the
court’s “reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress intended the statute . .
. to affect business, consumers, and the law.” 203 Both presumptions apply with full
force here.
PACA’s affidavit of merit and expert witness qualifications sections share similar
preemption language. The affidavit of merit section’s preemption clause provides that
“[n]o provision of this section shall be construed to preempt any State law . . . that
establishes additional requirements for the filing of an affidavit of merit or similar
pre-litigation documentation.” 204 Similarly, the expert witness qualifications section
provides that nothing in that section “shall be construed to preempt and State law . . .
that places additional qualification requirements upon any individual testifying as an
194
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expert witness.”205 It is immediately apparent that these sections intend to set a
minimum standard—a legislative floor. The preemption scope, then, is anything below
the standard contained in PACA’s substantive subsections.
Accordingly, the issue becomes determining how a state can overcome this
standard to avoid preemption. The answer to this question turns on whether Congress
contemplated a qualitative or quantitative standard. If Congress intended the standard
be qualitative, it will be determined more akin to a totality of the circumstances
standard, based on factors as opposed to elements. Conversely, a quantitative standard
indicates a conjunctive elements test should apply. This test is analogous to a checklist;
if enough elements can be checked off, the standard is met.
In both sections, the word “additional” dictates the preemption scope. “Additional”
is vague and, taken out of context, can be ambiguous. In these sections, “additional”
acts as an adjective modifying “requirements” and “qualifications requirements.”
Although “additional” could indicate a qualitative 206 standard, its dictionary and
ordinary meanings are more naturally inclined to a quantitative standard. 207 Further,
at least one federal circuit court has interpreted the ordinary meaning of “additional”
as “supplemental.” 208 A typical preemption analysis would require courts to compare
PACA and the state statute at issue, and at the outset, determine if the state statute
contains all of PACA’s core elements. 209 If the state statute is missing one or more of
those core elements, PACA would preempt it, regardless of whether the state statute
imposes different requirements. For example, Texas’ expert witness qualifications
statute requires that the expert be a licensed physician, which is the same basic
requirement as PACA’s first core element. 210 However, the Texas statute does not
require specialty matching—PACA’s second core element. 211 Thus, the Texas statute
could not meet the threshold inquiry and would, therefore, be preempted.
The Texas statute provides a decent example, but it is by no means a close call;
PACA would easily preempt it. Michigan’s certificate of merit statute provides a better
example, especially since PACA’s affidavit of merit section is based off of it. As
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previously discussed, PACA adopts 95% of the Michigan statute’s language. 212
Consequently, given the statutory language similarity between the two, Michigan’s
statute undoubtedly meets the first seven core elements. However, the eighth core
element is unique to PACA. So despite 95% of Michigan’s statutory language being
present in PACA, Michigan’s statute cannot meet the threshold analysis necessary to
avoid preemption. But this leaves open the question of what a state must do to satisfy
the additional requirements language. More specifically, is representative Cohen’s
conclusion that state statutes mirroring PACA’s provisions would survive preemption
correct?
Luckily, PACA’s expert witness qualifications section, and the Arizona statute the
drafters borrowed, provide an example. Unlike its affidavit of merit section, PACA’s
expert witness qualifications section does not add an additional core element to the
Arizona statute, and these sections match just as closely—95%. More importantly,
both statutes contain the same four core elements.213 So the threshold question here is
met. But PACA’s preemption provisions require that the state statutes have additional
requirements. 214 For a state statute like Arizona’s to survive preemption, “additional”
would have to take on a meaning akin to “greater than or equal to.” Considering the
dictionary and ordinary meanings of “additional,” attempting to force such a definition
places a meaning on the word that it simply cannot bear. 215 As a result, just like it did
the Michigan certificate of merit statute, PACA—the Arizona expert witness
qualifications statute’s progeny—would ultimately prevail.
As a threshold to avoiding preemption, state statutes must incorporate all of
PACA’s core requirements. However, because of the presumptions against
preemption of state law, particularly in areas of traditional state regulatory primacy,
states can probably satisfy PACA’s individual core elements with similar provisions.
Medical malpractice is a common law claim in an area of traditional state police
power—the health and safety of a state’s citizens. As such, the “thumb on the
interpretive scale” for areas of state police power will likely lead courts to err on the
side of allowing state provisions, which are in the same general category as a PACA
provision to counterbalance during a preemption analysis.216 Further, as previously
established, state certificates of merit and expert witness qualifications vary greatly.
Since PACA’s preemption provision leaves room for state laws, courts are unlikely to
require that state provisions be identical to PACA’s. Thus, if a state’s statute
incorporates a provision analogous to PACAs, that provision should weigh in favor of
the state statute surviving preemption. 217
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C. Extent to Which State Statutes Will Be Preempted
With PACA preempting the state statutes it is based on, another question
emerges—do any state statutes survive? The Arizona and Michigan statutes are again
helpful, both contain substantially stringent provisions, of which few, if any states can
match. Thus, PACA very likely preempts every state certificate of merit and expert
witness qualifications statute currently in effect.
1.

PACA Will Preempt All State Certificates of Merit

Michigan’s statute is arguably the strictest state statute enacted to date. Returning
to the certificate of merit elements identified earlier, Michigan’s statute adopts the
stricter approach as to every element. 218 First, Michigan’s statute adopts the stricter
approach regarding the expert witness’s role in making the certificate of merit. 219 It
requires that the plaintiff’s expert, rather than her attorney, sign the affidavit. 220 Next,
Michigan’s statute requires that the attorney reasonably believe the expert meets the
necessary qualifications in Michigan’s heightened expert witness qualifications
statute.221 Also, Michigan takes one of the, if not the, strictest approaches of any state
regarding what the expert must attest to in the affidavit. 222 Michigan requires that the
expert attest to (1) the appropriate standard of care, (2) their opinion that that duty was
breached, (3) what actions the defendant should have taken or omitted to comply with
the duty, and (4) how the defendant’s breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s
harm.223 While some states also require similar statements, thorough research has not
revealed any states that go farther. Therefore, since no state goes beyond the
requirements Michigan imposes, and PACA would preempt Michigan’s certificate of
merit statute, PACA would also preempt every other state statute, creating a uniform
federal standard in every jurisdiction. Further, if a state desires to enact a statute that
would survive PACA in the future, that state would need to formulate a new certificate
of merit requirement, because PACA incorporates every major provision states
currently use.
2.

PACA Will Preempt Most Expert Witness Qualifications Statutes

Like Michigan’s certificate of merit statute, Arizona’s expert witness
qualifications section also represents one of the strictest state statutes in effect.224
Arizona’s statute requires that the defendant and expert share, not only the same
specialty, but any relevant subspecialties, as well as any board certifications. 225 In this
respect, Arizona adopts one of the strictest approaches of any state. However, contrary
to Michigan’s certificate of merit statute, Arizona takes a laxer approach to some of
218
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the other elements. For instance, Arizona requires experts to have been practicing for
a one-year period prior to the alleged malpractice by the defendant.226 Other states, in
contrast, require up to six years prior experience leading up to the plaintiff’s injury. 227
More importantly, however, Arizona fails to include one of the major state
approaches—regional restrictions on experts. Accordingly, PACA also fails to include
such a provision. So, it is possible that a state could enact a statute similar to PACA
and Arizona’s statute and include a regional restriction on expert witnesses. As of yet,
however, the states that do impose regional restrictions do not appear to meet PACA’s
preemption threshold inquiry of first sharing all of the core elements. 228
3.

PACA’s Negative Effects

In addition to federalism concerns, PACA’s vague preemption provisions raise
several negative practical implications.229 First, mandating a uniform tort-reform
standard is not sound policy. Commentators have studied and dissected state tort
reform measures for decades. But, in spite if this, commentators disagree, first and
foremost, that the litigation crises are even real. 230 Among those that believe in the
crises, there is no agreement that tort-reform is effective in remedying the problem. 231
And of those commentators that (a) believe the problem exists and (b) agree tort
reform may fix it, there is still no consensus on what measures are optimal.232 There
226
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is likewise no conclusive evidence that the measures PACA adopts are preferable to
the other approaches some states take. As such, allowing states to establish unique
standards provides data that can then be evaluated to determine what approaches are
superior. However, setting a uniform standard eliminates these useful comparators.
Thus, until a clearly preferable approach is identified, Congress should not adopt a
uniform standard for uniformity’s sake.
Furthermore, by not explicitly stating its intent to preempt all state laws, PACA
necessitates a state-by-state preemption analysis. Because no federal cause of action
for medical malpractice exists, this analysis will occur primarily in state courts, which
are less qualified than federal courts to determine preemption. 233 Thus, if PACA is
enacted, state courts in the twenty-seven states with certificate of merit statutes in
effect will have to decide whether PACA preempts that state’s statute. Given PACA’s
preemption language ambiguity and the drafter’s veiled intent, these state trial and
appellate courts will likely reach different interpretations, and it is almost certain that
courts of different states that must interpret PACA’s provisions in relation to vastly
different state statutes will come to different conclusions. PACA’s vagueness will
create disparate applications across state and local jurisdictions.
V.

CONCLUSION

“To do nothing is sometimes a good remedy”
—Hippocrates
Extreme diseases often require extreme remedies (cancer is treated with
chemotherapy and radiation; doctors will cut off a hand to save an arm). But these
extreme remedies are only appropriate after the ailment has been diagnosed. As it
stands, the most appropriate remedy for this extreme disease is simple—Congress
should do nothing. Before administering a remedy, the disease must be diagnosed.
Despite decades of examination, the maladies infecting the healthcare system remain
a mystery. Right now, each state represents a laboratory for innovation and
experimentation, fifty experimental trials seeking an effective remedy to an extreme
disease. Unless and until one of these remedies proves effective, Congress should do
nothing. Luckily, in today’s political climate, doing nothing is what Congress does
best, so the healthcare system might get exactly the medicine it needs.

panels actually increase litigation costs and considerably reduce insurer profitability. In
addition, although capping of damages does not result in any additional economic harm to the
insurer, it has had minimal positive impact at best and has exacted enormous social costs. The
certificate of merit requirement, on the other hand, has proven effective in reducing insurers'
litigation costs without significant social costs. However, because many jurisdictions employ
the certificate of merit requirement along with other, less effective, and more damaging means
of litigation reform, the benefits of the certificate of merit reform are often cancelled out by
the deleterious effects of the more harmful reform approaches.”).
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See Bauer, supra note 192, at 9.

